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IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURAL CHANGE: 
WHO, HOW, WHY, AND WHEN? 
Stephen B. Burbank* 
What does it mean to "implement procedural change"? On a 
narrow view, the question concerns only the fate of a new or 
different procedural norm or technique once it has been con- 
ceived. Yet, as the RAND Report makes clear,' both in its dis- 
cussion of the literature on organizational change and in its ap- 
plication of insights from that literature to the performance of 
the federal judiciary under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 
(the CJRA),2 the nature and extent of procedural implementa- 
tion in that narrow sense cannot usefully be considered without 
reference either to the source of the impulse/directive to change 
or to the process by which that impulseldirective came into be- 
ing. 
More generally, a consideration of procedural change should 
include attention to the actors responsible for conceiving it and 
carrying it out (Who?); the processes by which the responsible 
actors conceive it and carry it out (How?); the reasons for, and 
information underlying, the impulseldirective to change (Why?); 
and the occasions on which action should be taken (When?). 
Reflection upon the CJRA, the events that led up to it, and 
the events that it initiated, has much to offer those who are 
interested in civil justice reform-which is to say, I hope, all of 
us--on each of these questions. Moreover, contrary to what may 
* David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of 
Pennsylvania. Charles Geyh, Anthony Scirica, and Norma Shapiro provided helpful 
comments on a draft of this Article. 
1. JAMES S. ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST, 
SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE hhNAGEMENT UNDER 
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 51-55 (1996) [hereinafter RANI) REPORT]. 
2. CiviI Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (cod.- 
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994)). 
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be fast becoming conventional wisdom, the RAND Report makes 
a contribution to our knowledge on all of them. 
Viewed retrospectively, the CJRA demonstrates the impor- 
tance of early and ongoing cooperation between the federal judi- 
ciary and the Congress in responding to calls for procedural 
change. "Cooperationn for these purposes requires (1) genuine 
dialogue, rather than pro forma consultation; (2) restraint in 
assertions about power, prerogatives, and competence; and (3) 
willingness to compromi~e.~ 
Viewed contemporaneously-that is with the benefit of the 
RAND Report-the CJRA demonstrates both that which limits 
and the limits of procedural reform. That which limited the 
CJRA reforms included the legislation's vague wording, which 
was emblematic both of compromises made during the legisla- 
tive process and of its weak empirical foundation. It also includ- 
ed Congress' failure to work with the judiciary in the process of 
identifjing the need for change and in the preliminary identifi- 
cation of promising remedies, and the judiciary's consequent 
failures of leadership when it came time to carry out the negoti- 
ated compromises. These failures of leadership rendered impos- 
sible changes in the local legal culture of the practicing bar, 
whose commitment to the CJRA is also subject to q~es t ion .~  
As to the limits of procedural reform, the judiciary has rea- 
son to stress the Report's finding that "[ilssues unrelated to 
judicial case management account for 95 percent of the variation 
in litigation costs.n5 Yet, the larger significance of that finding 
may lie in confirming both the fatuousness of claims by either 
the judiciary or the Congress to exclusive competence or power 
in this arena, and the importance of cooperation in the search 
for solutions to the problem of litigation costs. Moreover, as the 
Report also suggests, the cooperation necessary for effective 
reform must include the practicing bar.6 
The RAND Report also demonstrates what social scientists 
have long realized, but which so oRen comes as news to those 
3. See infia text accompanying notes 11-72. 
4. See infia text accompanying notes 73-105. 
5. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Rand Study Finds 95% of Cost in 
Civil Litigation Outside Courts' Control 1-2 (Jan. 29, 1997) (News Release) [hereinaf- 
ter News Release]. 
6. See infia text accompanying notes 90-95. 
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unfamiliar with empirical research; namely, the limits of such 
research as an aid to lawmaking.' However, particularly since 
there may be a tendency to emphasize, and perhaps to misap- 
prehend, the Report's finding that only very few procedural 
techniques had a statistically significant effect on measures of 
interest, it is important to note respects in which those limited 
findings may have broader significance.' 
Viewed prospectively, the CJRA, the process it initiated in 
the federal judiciary, and the experience under it as reflected in 
the RAND Report, all confirm my view that the urgent need now 
is for dialogue at a point anterior to actual lawmaking, dialogue 
concerning "where we have been, where we are going and where 
we should be goinfg in procedural law reform. 
Whether or not one acknowledges that, in order to be effec- 
tive, the effort to bring about consequential procedural reform 
must be broader than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, both 
the processes that led to the CJRA and recent amendments to 
the Federal Rules and the results of those "reformsn should 
sffice to persuade that the status quo is unacceptable. More- 
over, both experiences should also sffice to persuade that the 
dialogue must include the practicing bar, which may have the 
power to defeat change, if not when it is proposed, then when it 
is put in place.'' 
A. Life (in Court) Before the CJRA 
Complaints about cost and delay in the courts are probably 
as old as courts themselves." In this country, and in connection 
with the federal courts, such complaints have periodically fueled 
7. E.g., Richard 0. Lempert, "Between Cup and Lip": Social Science Influences 
on Law and Policy, 10 LAW & POLV 167 (1988). 
8. See infia text accompanying notes 96-104. 
9. Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a 
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 855 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
10. See infia text accompanying notes 106-29. 
11. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popuhr Dissatisfaction with the Adminis- 
tration of Justice, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: P RSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE 
FUrURE 337 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). 
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efforts to bring about procedural change. 
The major reform effort in this century lasted more than 
thirty years, and it brought us both the Rules Enabling Act in 
1934 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.12 Those 
events represented a major shift in the locus of power to govern 
procedure in actions at law in the federal trial courts-from the 
legislative to the judicial branch-what I have elsewhere de- 
scribed as "a power grab by the judiciary, [and] one that was 
remarkably successful for many years."13 
The success of the Federal Rules and of the Enabling Act 
process that brought them forth was attributable, I believe, to 
(1) the loose texture of Federal Rules, (2) the long-enduring 
disposition of federal trial judges to leave '%he real power in 
litigation with lawyers and their clients,"" and (3) a related 
point, the relative homogeneity of the federal bench and of the 
bar that practiced before it.'' 
Recent years have brought shifts in the locus of power, both 
in fashioning the rules of the litigation game (or its alternatives) 
and in directing the game as it is played. In my view, the latter 
shift-in which power moved from lawyers and their clients to 
judges-was influential in precipitating the former-in which 
power moved from the federal judiciary to Congress.16 
In seeking the causes of, and the critical events that precipi- 
tated, the shift in the locus of effective power in federal litiga- 
tion from lawyers (and their clients) to judges, I have been 
drawn to the phenomenon we know as complex litigation and to 
the breakdown in the homogeneity of the federal bench and bar. 
Complex litigation became a catalytic force with the electri- 
cal equipment antitrust cases in the 1950s and the institutions 
and techniques that were developed to handle the perceived 
12. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pk L. 
REV. 1015, 1035-98 (1982). 
13. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513, 513 
(1996); Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Pmt: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK L. REV. 1, 14 (1988). 
14. Burbank, supra note 13, at 514. 
15. "Since abuses are in the eye of the beholder, and since federal judges and 
practitioners for many years had the same vision, there were few perceived abuses." 
Id. 
16. The CJRA is  perhaps the most notorious, but not necessarily the most im- 
portant, example. 
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crisis that those cases posed for the federal judiciary. The insti- 
tutions and techniques in question, which included the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation17 and the Manual for Complex 
Litigation,'* empowered judges "at the expense of others, in- 
cluding lawyers, litigants, and juries."lg They furnished models 
when the perceived crisis of expense and delay in the federal 
courts became more widespread in the 1970s. 
The federal judiciary was once an elite and relatively homo- 
geneous group, sharing much by way of background, education, 
and worldview with the lawyers who practiced before it. The 
social revolution of the 1960s, the quest for diversity on the 
bench it initiated, and changes in the legal profession brought 
about both by that revolution and by the revolution of competi- 
tion all may have contributed to the dissolution of the ties that 
bound bench and bar, which ties included shared professional 
values and a shared sense of abusive c0nduct.2~ 
Although the disintegration of the legal profession, in the 
sense of a professional elite with shared values, was already 
well underway in the 1970s, it was true then, as it true today, 
that public images of the practice of law are disproportionately 
shaped by a small proportion of lawyers whose own experiences 
and interests determine the nature of those images?' And so, 
complex litigation in federal courts became the dominant image, 
and the late 1970s witnessed a sustained outcry by the Ameri- 
can Bar Association against excessive cost and delay, particular- 
ly in di~covery.~~ 
17. See 28 U.S.C. Q 1407 (1994). 
18. See Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 
25 F.R.D. 351 (1960); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (1969); MANUAL FOR COM- 
PLEX LITIGATION (2d ed. 1985); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (3d ed. 1995). 
19. Burbank, supra note 13, at 515. 
20. See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at 
War with the Profession and its Values, 59 BROOK L. REV. 931 (1993). See also 
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 63-70 (1995) (discussing changes in the legal 
profession). 
21. See, e.g., Marc S. Galanter, The Day Af)er the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. 
L, REV. 3 (1986); Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We 
Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and 
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983). 
22. See, e.g., SECTION OF LITIGATION, ABA, REPORT OF THE SPEC- C O M M I T T E E  
FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE (19771, reprinted in 92 F.R.D. 149 (1982); 
Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 998, 1000. (1980) 
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Faced with requests from p o w e f i  forces within the bar to 
save lawyers from themselves, and having regard "to their own 
professional interests as well as to the interests of practicing 
lawyers, litigants, and society,"23 federal judges generalized the 
models that had been developed for managing unusual cases, 
models that empowered them. They also brought to center stage 
a variety of techniques for d i sempowe~g  lawyers and their 
clients that had previously been only bit players in the theater 
of litigation: sanctions for litigation abuse.% Their task in doing 
so was made easier by a shift in the composition of the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee. Originally composed primarily of dis- 
tinguished members of the practicing bar and academics, by the 
1970s that committee came to be dominated by federal judges.2S 
From this perspective, it is no coincidence that at the very 
time when the federal judiciary was wresting power from law- 
yers (and their clients) by putting in place general rules that not 
only enabled but encouraged trial judges to take control of all 
civil litigation and required them to root out abuse, the judiciary 
began to lose what had been essentially a monopoly of power to 
fashion the rules of the game. And from this perspective, con- 
trary to conventional wisdom, it may not have been the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, which did not survive the Enabling Act pro- 
cess, that marked the critical event, but rather the 1983 amend- 
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which did survive 
that process. 
(Powell, J., dissenting statement) (criticizing 1980 amendments to Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure as a "compromisen and as "tinkering changesn). 
The result is a picture of the dispute landscape sadly lacking in perspective, 
and the problem is not simply empirical. The rhetorical tendency of the 'litiga- 
tion explosionn story is to deflect attention from values other than efficient 
administration in the effort to end the "crisis," dam the "flood," or stem the 
"avalanche." 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1467-68 
(1987) (book review). 
23. Burbank, supra note 13, a t  515 (footnote omitted). 
24. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformution of American Civil Procedure: 
The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank, 
Transformation]; Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOPSTRA L. REV. 
997 (1983) bereinafter Burbank, Sanctions]. 
25. See Laura Kaster & Kenneth Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, 
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, a t  15; Burbank, supra note 9, a t  847-48. 
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To be sure, the Federal Rules of Evidence marked a sharp 
break with the past in that Congress refused to acquiesce in 
proposals coming to it from the Supreme Court under the En- 
ab@g Act?6 Moreover, it may be that the significance of 
Congress' insistence on its own prerogatives transcended the 
occasion, breaking the spell of forty years in a defining psycho- 
logical moment and forever putting Congress on guard against 
judicial overreaching. 
Overreach the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence certainly 
did, notably (but not exclusively) in the provisions regarding 
testimonial privileges, and that probably explains why Congress 
decided to treat the proposed rules as if they were proposed 
legislation?' But, apart from recognizing that the existence and 
content of evidentiary privileges are of intense interest and 
importance to many groups in society, we should also remember 
that this was the first comprehensive attempt to reform the law 
of evidence in the federal courts. In light of the law applicable 
before that time, it was a project comparable in ambition and 
scope to the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Pr~cedure.~' Even if 
one sees in Congress' anxiety about the short amount of time 
available to review such a project under the Enabling Act29 por- 
tents of its reaction to continuing refinements to a system that 
had been put in place in 1938, it is hard to see there portents of 
an appetite for broad legislation governing dispute resolution in 
the federal courts. Indeed, through a reform effort culminating 
in the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act, Congress sought 
to ensure that it would not have to become actively involved by 
mandating changes in the process by which Federal Rules are 
promulgated and by seeking to forestall o~erreaching.~~ 
26. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1018, 1020; see also Charles G. Geyh, Paradise 
Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary% Imperiled Role in  Congress, 7 1  
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1187-88 (1996) (discussing the end of judicial control over the 
promulgation of procedural rules). 
27. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1137-43, 1187, 1190. 
28. Id. at 1137-43; see also Jack B. Weinstein, The UniformiEy-Conformity Dilem- 
ma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REX. 353 (1969) 
(analyzing the choices faced by the drafters of the Rules of Evidence). 
29. H.R REP. NO. 93-650, at 3-4 (1973). 
30. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-52 (1988) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. $8 2071 et seq.); Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the 
Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and "Procedure" in  the Rules 
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Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence may have marked the 
beginning of the end of the judiciary's monopoly of power to  
fashion the rules of the game. But, I believe, it was the poison- 
ous environment fostered by the 1983 amendments to the Feder- 
al Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 11, that set the 
stage for the more recent, and much more serious, power strug- 
gles: Those amendments became effective, it is true, but only 
just barely, the House having passed legislation to prevent them 
taking effect on August 1, and the Senate bill not coming to the 
floor in time.31 In any event, to the extent that the controversy 
they engendered resulted from overreaching or from a failure of 
the process, one could have hoped that the 1988 amendments to 
the Enabling Act would prevent a reoccurrence. The damage was 
done, however, as the controversy that had preceded their effec- 
tive date continued-indeed intensified-thereafter, pitting law- 
yers against lawyers, lawyers against clients, and judges against 
both.32 
And so, by the end of the 1980s, not only had the legal pro- 
fession disintegrated in the throes of competition, but lawyers 
were at each others' throats in the courtroom as well as the 
marketplace, and some of them had come to resent federal judg- 
es for taking away their control of litigation and setting them 
against their colleagues and sometimes their clients. The myth 
of procedure as the neutral facilitator of the substantive law had 
been exploded, not just by the Federal Rules of Evidence, but by 
proposals more clearly within the heartland of procedure, includ- 
ing the 1983 amendments and proposals to amend Rule 68.% 
Members of Congress were by then accustomed to lobbying by 
interests opposed to or favoring proposed amendments and thus 
were encouraged to view rules of procedure as a magnet, if not 
for constituent interests, then for special  interest^.^^ The feder- 
al judiciary was without many Mends just as civil justice reform 
Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1029-36. 
31. See Burbank, Transformcrtwn, supra note 24, at 1948 n.119. 
32. See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL AW OF LITIGATION 
ABUSE 1-52 (2d ed. 1994); Burbank, supra note 9, at 844 n.22. 
33. See Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68 - Time to Abandon 
Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 425 (1986). 
34. See Geyh, supra note 26, at 1187-88, 1227; Paul D. Carrington, The New 
Order in Judicial Rulemuking, 75 JUDICATURE 161 (1991). 
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writ large became a national political issue. 
B. The CJRA in Context 
The CJRA was the product of mistakes on the part of both 
the Congress and the judiciary, which, if only because they at- 
tended the conception, progress, and passage of proposed legisla- 
tion, can properly be called political mistakes. 
It is no reproach to Senator Biden that, a t  a time when big 
business chose to make civil justice reform a national political 
issue-and with it reform of court procedure-he responded to 
the drumbeat of calls for an end to excessive expense and delay 
in civil litigation by seeking to assume a leadership role on the 
i~sues.3~ Nor should he be faulted for seeking guidance fkom a 
broad-based and thoughtful group of court users, the Brookings 
Task F~rce;~ '  quite the contrary. Finally in this aspect, it 
should not be surprising that when the Task Force achieved 
substantial consensus on the existence of, and promising meth- 
ods of solving, problems in the federal courts, Senator Biden 
deemed that an adequate foundation for proposed legi~lation.3~ 
There were, however, numerous mistakes made a t  this, the 
conception stage of implementing procedural change. They relate 
to the Who, the How, the Why, and the When. 
As to the Who and the How, it was a mistake for Senator 
Biden not to ensure that the group convened to advise him in- 
cluded substantial representation of sitting federal judges.* It 
is no answer to that criticism that federal judges dominated the 
Enabling Act process, which had failed to come to grips with the 
problems, because inquiry as to the existence, nature, and extent 
of problems was presumably the fist order of business for the 
35. "Senator Biden is not a captive of the insurance industry any more than he 
is the son of a Welsh coal miner. He is a politician who wanted a statute on civil 
justice reform." Burbank, supra note 9, a t  852 (footnotes omitted). 
36. TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS 
AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION vii (BROOKINGS, 1989) hereinafter BROOKINGS TASK 
FORCE REPORT]. 
37. See S. 2027, lOlst Cong. (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 15 (1990). 
38. The Brookings Task Force did not include a sitting federal judge. Four 
members out of thirty-six had a t  one time served on the federal bench. See 
BROOKINGS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 36, a t  45-49. 
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group, and because two wrongs do not make a right. By the late 
1980s it should have been apparent to everyone that federal 
judges and the practicing bar may have very different notions as 
to what is wrong with the civil justice system and what, if any- 
thing, should be done about it?' 
Moreover, Congress was just then concluding the most con- 
sequential overhaul of the Enabling Act process since 1934.40 
One might have thought that a freshly revised treaty, animated 
in part by Congress' expressed desire to disengage, would sug- 
gest the need closely to consult the judiciary about a possible 
breach of that treaty, if not to forbear from such a breach alto- 
gether. And if it was in part dissatisfaction with the pace of 
change through the Enabling Act process that animated Con- 
gress:' let us remember that some significant measure of that 
pace was due to changes made in anticipation of the 1988 leg- 
i~ l a t ion .~~  
At the point when the Brookings Task Force issued its re- 
port, and i n  light of the nature of its recommendations, another 
mistake was made in immediately translating those recommen- 
dations into proposed legi~lation.~~ For, whatever the merits, 
the basic thrust of the group's work-reform from the "bottom 
~p"~~-was radically at odds with one of the basic premises of 
modern federal procedure?' Perhaps more to the point, given 
that by the 1980s uniformity could reasonably have been 
thought a myth,'"j the federal judiciary was in the midst of a 
serious and well-publicized effort, encouraged by Congress, to 
discipline disuniformity at the local level?' "Consultation" in 
39. See supra text accompanying notes 23-34. 
40. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
41. See Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 
U W  & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 11416 (1991). 
42. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 27 (19881, reprinted in  1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 
5987-88 [hereinafter 1988 HOUSE  REPORT^ see also Geyh, supra note 26, at 1189 
n.124 (stating that the 1988 amendments only codified what was already an existing 
practice). 
43. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
44. BROOKINGS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 36, at 11. 
45. See, e.g., Burbank, Transfomtion, supra note 24, at 1929-41. 
46. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: 
Uniformity, Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 
2018-21 (1989). 
47. See Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role of Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62 
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the form of inviting comment on proposed legislation can be, or 
be perceived to be, akin to negotiating with a gun to the head. 
The federal judiciary was hardly blameless at this stage, 
however. I will not speak more of the legacy of overreaching, 
mythmaking, and constituency disintegration that contributed to 
the climate in which procedural reform engaged sustained politi- 
cal interest.48 That apart, the judiciary reacted to the proposed 
legislation that was founded on the Brookings Task Force Report 
in a way that, as Tom Lehrer would have said, was bound to 
lead to escalatio. In doing so, they took both the high ground 
and the low ground. Unfortunately, both caved in. 
On the high ground, although it was certainly appropriate 
for the judiciary to remind the Congress of the treaty we call the 
Enabling Act, then only recently updated, the judges did not 
stop there. They invoked, in addition, the irreducible preroga- 
tives of the federal courts under Article I11 of the Constitution as 
a means to dissuade Congress from pr~ceeding.~' 
These claims were fatuous, and the fact they have subse- 
quently been elaborated does not make them any less so, al- 
though it may conjure up a different meaning of the adjective." 
Against a background of overreaching by the rulemakers, and 
notwithstanding the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Acts, 
repeated invocation of the Enabling Act process to forestall con- 
gressional action reaps the "[wlages of [clrying [wl~lf ."~~ Far
worse, however, is to tell Congress what it may hear as an as- 
sertion that it has no constitutional business concerning itself 
with matters that, notwithstanding the labels we affix to them, 
have attracted sustained political interest. In any event, the 
strategy backfired, eliciting equally fatuous claims of exclusive 
(1989); 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 28-29. 
48. See supm text accompanying notes 11-34. 
49. For an account of the judiciary's participation in the legislative process lead- 
ing up to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, see Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter- 
Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 407-18 (1992). 
50. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 850-52; see also Lauren Robel, Fractured 
Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1472-83 
(1994) (arguing that the CJRA does not violate separation of powers or statutory 
limits on Congressional rulemaking). 
51. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolfi A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 
82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). 
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legislative power in the Senate Report on the CJRA.52 
On the low ground, the judiciary designated a special task 
force of judges to work with the Senate Judiciary Committee in 
revising the proposed legislation. Senator Biden, at least, 
thought that the process resulted in revisions that were accept- 
able to the judiciary. He was understandably upset when, there- 
after, the Judicial Conference publicly expressed continuing 
opposition-based on the views not of the members of the special 
task force, but of the Conference's Committee on Judicial Im- 
provements-~~ upset that the Senate Report retails a highly 
unflattering account.53 Perhaps the judiciary may be excused 
for naivete as to the rules of the political game, but the lesson is 
one they cannot afford to forget. 
Finally, as to the Who and the How, we should consider 
here another mistake made by the judiciary, not in the process 
that led to the CJRA, but as a direct result of that experience. I 
refer to the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26 regarding required disclosures." As proposed, these 
amendments attracted far more consistently negative comments 
from the practicing bar than had the proposals to amend Rule 
11 in the early 1 9 8 0 ~ . ~ ~  The reaction was so thoroughly nega- 
tive that, a t  one point, the Advisory Committee decided to aban- 
don the enterprise. It was persuaded to take up the cudgels 
again, however. 
Among the arguments that seem to have carried the day 
was the notion that the judiciary needed to reassert its leader- 
ship in discovery reform.56 This notwithstanding pleas that the 
rulemakers await the evaluation of experience under the CJRA 
and notwithstanding the fact that the existence of such experi- 
mentation required permission in a putatively national rule to 
opt out at the local leveL5' The circumstances thus induced an 
unprincipled departure from the norm of uniformity, one that 
52. See S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 13-14 (1990). 
53. See id. at 6-7. 
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a). For a more favorable view of this episode, by one who 
was involved in it ,  see Paul D. Carrington, Learning From the Rule 26 Brouhuha: 
Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295 (1994). 
55. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 846. 
56. See id 
57. See id. at 845-46. 
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could only doom another expressed goal of the rulemakers in 
forging ahead, to wit, bringing about "the cultural change the 
Committee sought."* 
And who flew the flag of leadership on behalf of the judicia- 
ry? Certainly not the Supreme Court of the United States. 
I t  is difficult . . . not to sense a crisis in federal procedural reform 
when the Chief Justice's letter transmitting the 1993 amend- 
ments to the Federal Rules disclaimed any implication "that the 
Court itself would have proposed these amendments in the form 
submitted," and when four other Justices indicated their agnosti- 
cism about, lack of competence to evaluate or disagreement with, 
one or more of the amendments. When a majority of the Supreme 
Court has washed its hands of proposed Federal Rules, and when 
some of the Justices have aired the dirty Linen, what is it that 
should restrain Congress from responding to those who wish to do 
the same?59 
It is a wonder that the 1993 amendments became effec- 
tive-another very close callm-and no wonder that the judicia- 
ry emerged from the CJRA and immediately following 
rulemaking battles with even fewer friends than it had before.61 
As to the Why and the When, although it is understandable 
that Senator Biden regarded the work of the Brookings Task 
Force as adequate foundation for proposed legislation, it is also 
regrettable. To be sure, we all know legislation that rests on a 
weaker foundation of demonstrated need and efficacious remedy. 
Yet, due in large part to the work of Marc Galanter, the mythic 
quality of much that parades as fact in debates about civil jus- 
tice reform has been known for more than a decade.62 That it 
has been just as widely ignored does not excuse our lawmakers, 
58. Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of 
Committee Meeting 7 (Apr. 13-15, 1992); Burbank, supra note 9, a t  845 n.30. 
59. Burbank, supra note 9, a t  842 (footnotes omitted). 
60. See William J. Hughes, Congressional Reaction to the 1993 Amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 SETON HW LEGIS. J. 1, 3-4, 9-11 (1993). 
61. See Carrington, supra note 54, a t  295-96. 
62. See supm note 21. For an amusing, albeit depressing, experience, compare 
Dick Thornburgh, America's Civil Justice Dilemma: The Prospects for Reform, 55 MD. 
L. REV. 1074 (1996), with Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 
55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996). Mr. Thornburgh provides the anecdotes; Professor 
Galanter administers the antidote. The juxtaposition, of which Professor Galanter 
was, he informs me, ignorant until the issue appeared, is delicious. 
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although it does tend to confirm Holrnes' observation that 
"[ilgnorance is the best of law reformers."'j3 
It is only a partial defense of Congress, if it is a defense a t  
all, that the federal judiciary's track record of seeking data be- 
fore initiating procedural reform had been abysmal and that 
what in this account poisoned the rulemaking well-the 1983 
amendments to Rule 11-proceeded in a "virtual empirical vac- 
u u ~ n . " ~ ~  For the legislative and rulemaking games are played 
by different rules, and at least the latter espouses a norm of 
r a t i~na l i ty .~~  
From this perspective, it is not sufiticient that the Brookings 
Task Force may have been diverse (apart fkom the exclusion of 
active judges)% and achieved substantial consensus on the exis- 
tence of, and promising remedies for, problems of expense and 
delay in federal civil litigation. Just as reputations are an aggre- 
gation of hearsay, so may notions about the universe of litigation 
reflect nothing more than the success of cosmic anecdotes in 
orbit. "The plural of anecdote is not data."67 And in an informa- 
tion vacuum, opinion surveys, however scientifically conducted, 
are worth the data on which the opinions are founded.68 
The empirical basis underlying the CJRA is particularly 
troublesome when it is recalled that, even if an adequate foun- 
dation for lawmaking of some sort, it was hardly such for the 
specific recommendations of the Broolrings Task Force, which in 
turn became the stuff of proposed legislation with which the 
judiciary had to deal in negotiations. Fortunately, most of what 
was mandatory in the proposed legislation became hortatory in 
the finished produ~t.~' According to this view, the provisions for 
63. OLIVER WENDELL FOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 64 (Mark DeWolfe Howe 
ed., 1963). See Burbank, supra note 9, a t  841. 
64. Burbank, supra note 9, a t  844. 
65. See POSNER, supra note 20, a t  126-35. 
66. But see Mullenix, supra note 49, a t  389 n.42 ("Despite the apparent diversi- 
ty of the task force, its membership was heavily weighted with corporate and in- 
surance interests.") 
67. Edith Greene, A Love-Hate Relatwnship, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 99, 100 (1995) 
(book review). 
68. Both the Brookings Task Force and the Senate Judiciary Committee placed 
heavy weight on the results of various sweys.  See BROOKINGS TASK FORCE REPORT, 
supra note 36, a t  6-7; S. REP. NO. 101-416, a t  6-8 (1990). For criticism of the Actls 
empirical basis, see Mullenix, supra note 49, a t  396-97 n.90. 
69. See Robel, supra note 50, a t  1450. 
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mandatory evaluation that have brought us the RAND Report 
may be the CJRA's greatest and most enduring accomplishment, 
providing more and more reliable inf0rmation.7~ 
Finally, in connection with the When (the occasions on 
which action should be taken), it bears repeating that the timing 
of the CJRA was doubly unfortunate. Coming so closely on the 
heels of legislation that culminated a four year effort, led by the 
House of Representatives, to reform and discipline the Enabling 
Act process," the CJRA, driven by a powertl Senator, could be 
viewed as repudiation of the new treaty. And, coming in the 
midst of a serious effort by the judiciary to reform and discipline 
the process of local rulemaking:2 it could be viewed as repudia- 
tion of both that effort and the premise on which it was built: 
the continuing vitality of a norm of uniform federal procedure. 
Viewed in the light of the RAND Report, the CJRA experi- 
ence enriches our understanding of procedural change in each of 
the four dimensions I have charted. 
As  to the Who and the How, I have already noted the light 
that the RAND Report casts on defining and thinking about 
implementing procedural ~hange.7~ One suggestion is that par- 
ticipants in an organizational structure should be involved in a 
process that leads to a shared recognition of the need for change 
if that change is to be effe~tive.7~ Another is that the leaders of 
the enterprise must be not simply involved, but committed-not 
the chicken, but the pig, in eggs and bacon." A third is that 
effective change requires "clear-cut  directive^"^^ and "clearly 
specified goals."77 
In assessing "the limited degree of change" effected by the 
70. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 5 105, 104 Stat. 
5089, 5098 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. $5 471-482 (1994)). 
71. Supra text accompanying notes 30, 40. 
72. Supm text accompanying note 47. 
73. Supra text accompanying note 1. 
74. See RAND REPORT, supm note 1, at 40-44. 
75. See id. at 44-45. 
76. See id. at 33. 
77. See id. at 41. 
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CJRA, the RAND Report assigns a major role to the "intention- 
ally vague wording of some of the act's case management prin- 
ciples and techniques," observing that "Mad the act been less 
ambiguous, there might have been more ~hange."'~ Elsewhere, 
the Report suggests that "explicitly stated expectations would 
have helped individual districts align their efforts with the ob- 
jectives of the reform, provided judges and judicial staff with 
criteria to use in selecting performance strategies and assessing 
progress, and generated energy within and across districts as 
members sought to reach clearly specified goals."7g 
All of this may be true, but, given what we know of the 
process by which the CJRA came into being, greater clarity in 
these respects would have been purchased at the cost not just of 
a major confrontation, but of a rupture between the legislative 
and judicial bran~hes.~' Thus, the failure to seek early and ac- 
tive participation by the federal judiciary was also a mistake 
because, in their absence, legislation could not capture a shared 
vision of the need for change. Once the judiciary was involved, 
the process became a negotiation towards compromise, which is 
anathema to "clear-cut directives" and "clearly specified goals." 
Equally important, there was not a sufEcient empirical basis for 
~ i ~ c a n t l y  greater specificity either as to principles and tech- 
niques or as to the measures of their effectiveness. 
The RAND Report discusses CJRA principles or techniques 
that were widely (or even universely) eschewed, directly or indi- 
rectly, by advisory groups and their districts:' as well as others 
where, although they were the basis of plan elements, "imple- 
mentation often fell short."82 Quite appropriately in my view, it 
suggests as possible contributing causes both the failure to in- 
clude the judiciary early on in the legislative process and the re- 
lated failure of commitment to the enterprise by some members 
of the j~diciary.'~ Absence in the conception stage augurs ab- 
78. Id. at 33. 
79. RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 41 (footnote omitted). 
80. See supra text accompanying notes 38-53. 
81. See RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 26, 28. 
82. Id. at 32. 
83. Id. at 34-35. Moreover, many judges were already doing many of the things 
that the Brookings Task Force encouraged, which would have made it dimcult, if not 
impossible, to persuade them of the worth of the enterprise, even if they had been 
consulted earlier. This is a somewhat different view of both the RAND report and 
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sence, actual or figurative, when the time comes to carry out 
change. Reluctant players are not good candidates for leadership 
of a team. 
It is also important, as the RAND Report suggests, to con- 
sider the involvement and commitment of the practicing bar.84 
Recall that the litigation explosion, expense, and delay stories 
are the product of elites within the profession and that the pro- 
fession itself is sufficiently fragmented to call the very word in 
question.85 Recall also that the Brookings Task Force was after 
all a small group of people who presumably benefited from and 
were affected by the give and take of a common enterprise in 
which a powerful Senator had a stated interest. Recall finally 
that, in negotiating against the workproduct of that group, the 
federal judiciary was primarily concerned with its own preroga- 
tives and a system that it had designed. This is not a recipe for 
an embrace of change by the bar. 
The opportunity for members of the bar (and the public) to 
participate in advisory groups was "consistent with the notion of 
participatory management."86 Yet, the composition of those 
groups to the side, the matter may have reached a point for the 
bar as a whole that was functionally equivalent to the judiciary's 
opportunity to comment on the proposed legislation: a case of too 
little, too late. 
In any event, although active judicial leadership may be 
able to change local legal culture, in its absence procedural 
change is probably doomed. The RAND Report's attempt to  me- 
diate between what it calls "culturalist" and "proceduralist" 
themes by asserting that local legal culture "can be modified by 
the experience studied than that taken by the Judicial Conference of the United 
States in its report to Congress, which was issued after this paper was delivered. 
The Conference asserted that: 
The RAND study found that the pilot program per se did not appear to have 
significant impact on cost or delay reduction because the courts were already 
following most of the Act's principles, guidelines, and techniques and more 
importantly, the cost of litigation was driven by factors other than judicial 
case management procedures. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CIVIL JUSTICE R FORM ACT OF 
1990, FINAL REPORT 2 (May 1997) hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE FINAL REPORT]. 
84. See, e.g., RAND REPORT, supra note 1, a t  36-37. 
85. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
86. RAND REPORT, supra note 1, a t  42. 
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making the actors conform to different rules that limit discre- 
t i ~ n " ~ ~  is ambiguous. Local legal culture is shaped by both law- 
yers and judges, and as the Report elsewhere suggests,88 and 
experience with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confjrms, 
federal judges do not react well to rules that limit their discre- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  
In this light, it is not only the CJRA principles and tech- 
niques that were avoided and those that were implemented in 
name only that should attract our attention. Both the possibility 
of tepid leadership from federal judges and the short period 
between the initiation of CJRA plans and the RAND study sug- 
gest that the failure of more techniques that were implemented 
to have a statistically significant effect may be due in part to the 
persistence of local legal culture. 
To say that federal judges and practicing lawyers should be 
actively involved, in a timely fashion, in conceiving and refining 
proposed legislation concerning dispute resolution in the federal 
courts does not tell us anything about when such legislation is 
appropriate. Here again the RAND Report sheds light, although 
perhaps not in the direction perceived by the judiciary when its 
representatives wrote the press release spinning that document. 
It is extremely useful to know that "of the total variance 
explained by [the RAND] model, about 95 percent was explained 
by the control variables . . . [which] means that lawyer work 
hours seem to be driven primarily by factors other than case 
management policy.ng0 It is also useful to know that "[clase 
stakes and case complexity are the most important predictors of 
lawyer work hours,"91 although, why the judiciary's representa- 
tives changed stakes and complexity to "attorney perceptionsng2 
escapes me. 
This finding has obvious, albeit perhaps surprising, implica- 
tions for the design of fbture efforts to contain litigation ex- 
87. Id. at 37. 
88. Id. at 36. 
89. See, e.g., Burbank, Transformation, supra note 24, at 1929-34; POSNER, supra 
note 20, at 125. 
90. RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 211 (alteration in original). See supra text 
accompanying note 5. 
91. RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 211. 
92. News Release, supra note 5, at 2. 
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pense, suggesting yet another reason to reexamine the premises 
that in recent years have led the judiciary not simply to manage, 
but to create, complex casesg3 
Its more significant implications may be less obvious. For 
how is it that, acting alone, the judiciary would be able to attack 
the phenomenon of case stakes? More generally, if we acknowl- 
edge that "[llawyer entrepreneurs are ever anxious to create new 
procedural advantages as they are alert to existing advantag- 
es[,]"" we may be led to the view, ruefully offered by a com- 
mentator on recent procedural reform efforts in England, that 
only the overhaul of the system of litigation finance can conse- 
quentially attack the problem of litigation cost.95 That surely is 
a task for which Congress would have to take ultimate responsi- 
bility. 
This finding of the RAND Report, in other words, suggests 
generally that, as to some matters, effective procedural reform 
may be impossible if we insist on boundaries set in advance to 
mark the respective lawmaking preserves of the judiciary and 
the Congress. Specifically, it highlights the critical importance of 
finding ways to invest the practicing bar in the business of re- 
form. 
As to the Why and the When, it is important that key actors 
in the civil justice reform debate-judges, legislators and law- 
yers-appreciate the significance of the RAND Report, both in 
terms of its findings and as an important event in the history of 
procedural reform. 
Commenting on the work of Hans Zeisel, Judge Jack 
Weinstein observed that "[ilt is no sound criticism to suggest 
that much of Chis jury studies] confirmed what we suspected. 
Research supporting our suppositions is as valuable to policy 
makers as that undercutting them."% The same is true of the 
RAND Report. Indeed, confirmation (or disconfirmation) of our 
suppositions is peculiarly important in this area precisely be- 
cause, in the past, suppositions have so often been based on a 
93. See Burbank, supra note 22, at 1476-83. 
94. Burbank, supra note 13, at 517. 
95. See A.A.S. Zuckerman, Lord Wmlfs Access to Justice: Plus qa change . . . , 
59 MOD. L. REV. 773, 795-96 (1996). 
96. Jack B. Weinstein, Hans Zeisel's Contributions to the Administration of Jus- 
tice and the Sociology of Law, 41 U.  CHI. L. REV. 213, 218 n.23 (1974). 
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hunch or a theory. Speaking in 1959, Michael Sovern observed: 
Much of the diaculty stems from our lack of a systematized body 
of knowledge on the effects of proced~al devices. Too frequently, 
when we wish to determine whether a particular remedy consti- 
tutes an improvement, we guess, we suppose, we infer, of course 
we argue, and if by chance some social scientist has recently im- 
plored us to go out and get the facts, we extrapolate; but we rare- 
ly get the facts.97 
The situation had not changed in 1986, when Judge Posner 
wrote that "fllawyers, including judges and law professors, have 
been lazy about subjecting their hunches-which in honesty we 
should admit are often little better than prejudices-to system- 
atic empirical testing."98 Nor had it changed in 1996, when 
Marc Galanter observed that "[a] b d  of basic information about 
the working of our legal institutions, of a sort that we take for 
granted in discussions of the economy, or health care, or educa- 
tion, simply does not exist."= 
Moreover, the fact that the RAND study found that so few 
techniques had statistically significant effects on measures of 
interest may have broader significance. First, the finding of the 
RAND Report that few techniques had a statistically significant 
effect on time to disposition (delay)''' may suggest either that, 
properly defined, delay in fact is not a serious problem in the 
run of cases or at least that it is no more serious today than it 
was before the CJRA. Indeed, other statistical data in the RAND 
Report tend to confirm the latter proposition.lOl It may be, 
however, that a qualitatively adequate consideration of delay 
must include attention to the rate and timing of settlement. 
Second, in this aspect the RAND Report may provide evi- 
97. Michael I .  Sovern, Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice, 60 COLUM. 
L. REV. 50, 81 (1960). 
98. Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alterna- 
tive Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U.  CHI. L. REV. 366, 367 
(1986). 
99. Galanter, supra note 62, at 1155 (footnote omitted). See also JUDICIAL CON- 
FERENCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 46 (limits to federal courts' ability to 
effect delay reduction). 
100. RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 89-90 (Table 10.1). 
101. See id. at 146 (Table C.10). One reason for this might be that many judges 
were already doing many of the things that the CJRA encouraged. See supra note 
83. 
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dence of a phenomenon that might be called the mouse traps 
that did not catch any mice; it appears that an enormous 
amount of time and effort have been devoted to devising new, or 
propagating old, techniques that do not well serve the purposes 
for which they were intended. If so, we all might be better off if 
courts, lawyers, and litigants spent their time doing something 
else. To be sure, one needs to take account of possible influences, 
discussed above,'02 that may have contributed to RAND'S find- 
ings. But we should also remember that, just as 'R.AND con- 
firmred] that many of the case management practices long em- 
ployed by federal judges and incorporated into the federal rules 
are effective in reducing delay,"lo3 its work calls into question 
the effectiveness of other long-employed practices.lo4 
Third, one of the possible influences on RAND'S findings 
mentioned above merits independent attention here. We should 
consider whether the time interval between the initiation of 
techniques and the RAND study of experience with them was 
sufficient for those techniques to take hold, even assuming a pli- 
able local legal culture.'05 More generally, this experience sug- 
gests that a longer lead time should be given in the future for 
the evaluation of newly initiated procedural techniques. That is 
not good news for those who are impatient to effect change, and 
hence not good news for those who believe, as I believe, that 
empirical work should play a much more significant role in the 
procedural lawmaking of the future than it has in the past. 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 73-92. 
103. News Release, supra note 5, a t  1. 
104. See RAND REPORT, supra note 1, a t  89-90 (Table 10.1). 
105. The findings concerning initial disclosure under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) in a 
recent study of discovery conducted by the Federal Judicial Center for the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules may support this hypothesis. In that study, which was 
completed after this paper was delivered and which was based upon a survey of 
attorneys in civil cases that were closed during the last quarter of 1996, "more than 
80% of the respondents said disclosure had a t  least one of the desired effects" and 
"the vast majority said the effect was in the direction intended by the drafters of 
the 1993 amendments." THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., DISCOVERY AND DISC~SURE 
PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY 
OF COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 24 (FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 1997) 
(copy on file with author). 
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As a result of the CJRA and of subsequent legislation, nota- 
bly the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,1°6 the 
federal judiciary recognizes the need for cooperation when calls 
for procedural change become sufficiently loud, prolonged, or 
widespread to peak sustained political interest. At that point, 
however, the ball may not be in their court, and by that point 
the perception of a need to cooperate, rather than to consult in a 
pro forma way, may not be shared by members of Congress. 
Moreover, as Professor Geyh has recently and very ably pointed 
out, when considering cooperation in the legislative process the 
judiciary conflonts a paradox: "to maximize the flow of compe- 
tent information to Congress in the legislative process and risk 
credibility loss, or to preserve credibility a t  the expense of com- 
petent information flo~.""~ 
Conversely, the fact that issues of procedural law reform 
can peak sustained political interest has alerted the judiciary to 
consider the power, prerogatives, and competence of Congress 
when considering amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,loS but there is currently no method in place to seek 
its active cooperation in the rulemaking process. In addition, far 
from helping to disengage Congress from the process of proce- 
dural rulemaking, the changes made in the 1980s, which assimi- 
lated it to the legislative process, may encourage Congress "to 
second-guess the product of that process or to preempt it."lo9 
The judiciary also has come to recognize the value of seek- 
ing empirical data before formulating new or amended Federal 
Rules. It has not been consistent in that regard, however, and 
consideration of the circumstances recalls Professor Geyh's anal- 
ysis of the problem of credibility arising when judges' "efforts 
coincide with personal or institutional self-interest.""' 
Thus, a t  the very time that the Advisory Committee was 
carefully seeking facts in place of anecdotes to inform its consid- 
106. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (1995) (to be codified in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. O 77). 
107. Geyh, supra note 26, at 1222. 
108. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 842-43. 
109. Id. at 849-50 (footnote omitted). 
110. Geyh, supra note 26, at 1222. 
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eration of possible additional amendments to Rule 11 in the 
early 1990s, it refused to heed calls to delay any amendments to 
Rule 26 pending evaluation of experience under the CJRA."' 
That refusal, as we have seen, more likely reflects a turf 
war--or, if you wish, a struggle for "leadershipn-than a consid- 
ered judgment about the value of empirical study. Nonetheless, 
it weakened the judiciary's credibility both generally and in 
terms of its ability to insist upon empirical data as "a neutral 
counter to special pleading."lU 
More representative of current attitudes, I believe, are the 
Advisory Committee's decision to pull back proposed amend- 
ments to Rule 23 so as to seek additional information, both em- 
pirical data and the views of a broad spectrum of the practicing 
bar (and academics),'13 and its decision to embark on a consid- 
eration of discovery reform that will be similarly modeled.'" 
And one can only take heart from the recommendation in the 
Report of the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning that 
"[elach Advisory Committee should ground its proposals on 
available data and develop mechanisms for gathering and evalu- 
ating data that are not otherwise available, and should use 
these data to decide whether changes in existing rules should be 
propo~ed.""~ 
The rulemakers' recent attitudes towards cooperation with 
the practicing bar evince some of the same ambivalence seen in 
the approach to empiricism, which is to say that personal or 
institutional self-interest can be a dominating consideration. 
Thus, some of the progress made by the Advisory Committee in 
reaching out to the bar, through hearings, conferences, and 
liaison positions, has been undercut by actions recently taken on 
proposals to amend the Federal Rules that themselves could be 
111. See Burbank, supra note 13, at 516. 
112. Burbank, supra note 9, at 849. 
113. See Burbank, supra note 13, at 516; see also Thomas E. Willging et al., An 
Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 To Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 74, 80-82 (1996) (explaining the process leading to Federal Judicial Center 
empirical study). 
114. Conversation with Judge David Levi, United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California, in Tuscaloosa, A1 (Mar. 21, 1997). 
115. A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcommit- 
tee on Long Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and 
Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 168 F.RD. 679, 699 (1996). 
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considered a means to build bridges to the bar and the public. 
That, in any event, is one possible interpretation of the 
refisal to go forward with proposals to reestablish a norm of 
twelve person juries and to give lawyers a right to participate in 
voir dire.l16 From this perspective, it is ironic that concerns 
about courthouse construction and the personal impressions of 
decision maker^^^' prevailed in the face of compelling social 
science evidence that the size of the jury makes a difference.'18 
And what of Congress? As I have suggested, neither the 
CJRA nor the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
augurs well for a culture of cooperation with the judiciary when 
issues of procedural reform have peaked sufficient political inter- 
est to motivate a serious legislative proposal. And that hardly 
exhausts the list of recent statutes that invade territory previ- 
ously reserved to the judiciary.'l9 
On the rulemaking side, congressional liaisons are better 
than nothing, but, again, there is no structural mechanism for 
cooperation (as opposed to veto). Additionally, the remaking of 
the rulemaking process in Congress' image may have increased 
rather than decreased the likelihood that Congress will respond 
to calls for it to second guess the rule maker^.^^ 
For those who find more apt an analogy between the current 
rulemaking process and administrative lawmaking, the news is 
no better, even if it does support the analogy. As part of the so- 
called Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996,*' 
Congress created what Professor Strauss has described as "an 
automatic process for generating legislative consideration of 
disapproval in every case of agency rulemaking, that brings all 
116. See Marcia Coyle, Ruks Would Expand Voir Dire, Civil Jury Size, NAT'L 
L.J., Mar. 11, 1996, at A12; Burbank, supm note 13, at 516 n.16. 
117. These are the considerations that have been mentioned to me in conversa- 
tions with judges who participated in the deliberations. See also Judith Resnik, 
Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil 
Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 A= L. REV. 133. 
118. E.g., Hans ZeiseI & Shari Seidman Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evi- 
dence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1974); Richard 0. Lempert, 
Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury Size Cases, 
73 M C H .  L. REV. 644 (1975). 
119. E.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. 8, 110 
Stat. 1321 (1996) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 8 3601). 
120. See supra text accompanying note 109. 
121. 5 U.S.C.A. A.§ 801-808 (West Supp. 1997). 
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rules before Congress for review immediately upon their adop- 
t i~n . " '~~  In other words, Congress has extended the report and 
wait system we associate with the Enabling to all ad- 
ministrative rules. Although a number of Professor Strauss' 
concerns about this statute resonate with recent rulemaking 
experience, one is of particular interest. 
Professor Strauss worries that, in response to a variety of 
problems and costs associated with the new system, agencies 
may 
look for alternative means of accomplishing their business. They 
may be motivated to substitute a large number of lower-conse- 
quence rules for "major" ones, if that can lower their oversight 
exposures and costs . . . or to move from legislative rulemaking, if 
they can, to the issuance of guidance and policies . . . or, most 
dramatically, to achieve what they can through case-by-case adju- 
d i c a t i ~ n . ~  
The use of case-by-case adjudication to circumvent or pre- 
empt court rulemaking obstacles posed by the Enabling Act 
process is not unknown.'25 More to the point, in light of experi- 
ence under the CJRA we should be concerned about the "tempta- 
tion to make [difficult] choices in local and concerned 
that choices made at that level will, in Professor Robel's words, 
"destroy important procedural values."ln 
Looking forward in terms of Congress' attitudes towards the 
practicing bar and empirical data, I find no greater cause for 
optimism. If there is any longer an organized bar for purposes of 
taking positions on proposed court reform legislation, now that 
such bills are part of broader civil justice reform agendas, it pre- 
sumably would be the ABA, the prestige and influence of which 
are currently at a low ebb in Washington.lB And no one, I take 
122. Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American 
Rukmaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 768 (1996). 
123. 28 U.S.C. 3 2074 (1994). 
124. Strauss, supra note 122, at 772. 
125. E.g., Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985); Burbank, supra note 33, at 437- 
40. 
126. Burbank, supra note 9,  at 854 (alteration in original). 
127. Robel, supra note 50, at 1485. 
128. E.g., N .  Lee Cooper, Standing Up to Critical Scrutiny, 83 A.B.A. J., Apr. 
1997, at 6. 
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it, is so foolish as to see in the CJRA a principled and enduring 
commitment to founding procedural reform legislation on empiri- 
cal data. Those who harbor the thought should compare the re- 
cord leading to, and the assumptions underlying, the 1995 Secu- 
rities Litigation Reform Act with the results of the Federal Judi- 
cial Center's study of class  action^.^ 
V. CONCLUSION: CHANGING THE PROCESS FOR IMPLEMENTING 
PROCEDURAL CHANGE 
Considering the Who, the How, the Why, and the When, of 
implementing procedural change, we are confronted with a bleak 
future if we rest with current arrangements. The challenge is to 
devise solutions that adequately address all of those questions 
from the perspectives of all of those who are properly concerned. 
For that purpose, the RAND Report is again valuable, because it 
underlines the importance of actively involving all of the rele- 
vant constituencies in identifjing the need to change current 
arrangements and in devising alternative arrangements. 
Recent years have brought forth a number of thoughtful 
proposals for changing the process by which procedural change 
is conceived and effected, most recently from Professor Geyh. 
His proposal for a "permanent, independent, fifteen-member 
Interbranch Commission on Law Reform and the Judiciary"1so 
strikes me as particularly interesting and worth serious consid- 
eration. However, it is premature to the extent that it might be 
thought to preempt the process by which the vision of needed 
change is cooperatively developed and recommended solutions 
cooperatively determined. 
That is why I have called in the past, and call again, for a 
cooperative study of existing arrangements for implementing 
procedural change by representatives of the three branches of 
government and representatives of the practicing bar.''' I 
agree with Professor Geyh that a commission on the model of 
129. See, e.g., Willging et al., supm note 113, at 177-79. 
130. Geyh, supra note 26, at 1234. 
131. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 842, 85455; Burbank, Transformation, supm 
note 24, at 1936-41; Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme 
Court, Federal Ruks and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 718 (1988). 
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the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 
might serve well in this ~0n tex t . l~~  Rather than fixing on such 
a body as the permanent solution to preconceived problems, 
however, I would give it the limited anterior tasks of deterrnin- 
ing whether there is agreement about the existence and nature 
of those problems and, if so, of recommending solutions, which 
might include wholly new permanent structures. 
Assuming such a group shared my assessment of the inade- 
quacy of current arrangements, and that they would not easily 
be moved to recommend wholly new permanent structures of the 
sort proposed by Professor Geyh, perhaps their primary task 
would be to see if they could reach consensus on the proper roles 
of each branch of government as initiators, makers, and imple- 
menters of procedural law. To that end, it would be necessary to 
consider, among other questions, (1) the standards established 
by, and the procedures for, supervisory court rulemaking under 
the Rules Enabling Act, (2) the role of local court rulemaking, 
and (3) the proper occasions for legislation as opposed to court 
rules. 
Consideration of the last question will require a serious 
reexamination of the norm of trans-substantive procedure that, 
formally at least, has held sway since 1938.133 It will no longer 
suffice for the judiciary (or the ABA)'34 to object to legislation 
like the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 by 
invoking the Enabling Act process. Under current conceptions 
that process could not be used to fashion prospective rules whose 
application was limited to a particular substantive law context. 
Moreover, in revising substantive statutory law, it is unquestion- 
ably Congress' business to consider procedural provisions that 
may advance its policy 0bje~tives.l~~ 
132. See Geyh, supra note 26, a t  123435; Burbank, supra note 9, a t  855 n.102. 
See also A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Manngement: The Chllenge of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 877, 900 (1993) (noting that 
the CJRA could stimulate the creation of a commission on the classic model charged 
to develop proposals for legislative consideration). 
133. See, e.g., Burbank, Transformation, supra note 24, a t  1929-41. 
134. See ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, REPORT ACCOMPANYING RESOLUTION REAF- 
FIRMING SUPPORT FOR THE RULES ENABLING ACT PROCESS 20 (1995). 
135. See Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in 
Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 
1997). 
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It would also be important for such a group to ca remy 
address the conditions that should be deemed s f i c i en t  to 
prompt any prospective procedural lawmaking and the informa- 
tion (including empirical data) that should be deemed a prereq- 
uisite to change. In  that regard, both the RAND Report and the 
Report of the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning suggest 
that the promise of empirical work in aid of civil justice reform 
may lie more in its capacity to inform judgments about the need 
for change than in its capacity to inform judgments about the 
shape of changes that will meet a demonstrated need.13'j 
According to this view, it would usually be too much-take 
too much time and too much money-to expect, much less to 
require, controlled experimentation or other rigorous empirical 
work at the local level before adopting an innovation a t  the 
national level. It should not be too much, however, to expect 
credible evidence that supposed problems in fact exist--and are 
not the stuff of "cosmic anecdotess-before amending the Federal 
Rules or passing federal legislation. Moreover, even if we cannot 
or will not very often incur the expenses necessary to do a study 
like the RAND study, it may turn out that a sustained national 
commitment to collect systematic civil justice data, of the sort 
recommended by Professor Galanter and his  colleague^,'^' 
would be comparatively cost effective. For, as they point out: 
The absence of an adequate knowledge base not only impairs the 
optimal use of the legal system. It also makes lawyers and courts 
vulnerable to political attacks. This hostility has much deeper 
sources than problems of the knowledge base. But the absence of 
knowledge about the legal system provides a setting in which 
anger can be more easily mobilized politically and result in mis- 
guided policies. Lawyers and judges have a joint responsibility 
with the academic community to foster and support the develop- 
ment of a cumulative body of reliable knowledge about the work- 
ing of legal institutions, and they have a heavy stake in its devel- 
0 ~ m e n t . l ~ ~  
Although there has been a good deal of hysterical rhetoric 
136. See RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 1, 4; supra text accompanying note 115. 
137. Marc Galanter et al., How to Improve Civil Justice Policy, 77 JUDICATURE 
185 (1994). 
138. Id. at 230. 
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about the CJRA and the Rules Enabling Act in recent years, the 
notion that the latter should be regarded as a pact or treaty 
empowering and limiting both the judiciary and Congress has 
much to recommend it. In order to be an effective treaty, howev- 
er, it will probably require additional amendments and, perhaps, 
supplementation. One possible change that might advance a 
more effective partnership between the federal judiciary and the 
Congress is a mechanism for the rulemakers to propose rules for 
legislative adoption (perhaps on an expedited track).13' Such a 
mechanism would be useful for proposals that either approach or 
cross over the line deemed appropriate for court rules, leaving 
the normal process for the usual fare (if there is such a thing 
any more). It could be used by members of Congress to refer to 
the rulemakers' proposals for legislation that would benefit from 
thorough consideration by the judiciary but which require 
Congress' ultimate judgment. 
Another change that might improve the partnership is a 
mechanism for fast-track rulemaking, which could be employed 
when the process within the judiciary has not elicited controver- 
sy and which would probably require process alterations within 
both the judiciary and the Congress."' Consideration of this 
possibility might benefit from study of the recent system put in 
place for review of administrative agency rules."' 
Still another change that should be considered relates to the 
role of the Supreme Court. The Court's performance in 1993 was 
a n  embaras~ment , '~~  and its current posture towards 
rulemaking under the Enabling Act may do more harm than 
good from the point of view of congressional involvement. 
Finally, it would be appropriate for such a group to consider 
the problems that the fragmentation of the bar poses for any 
suggested system of implementing procedural change. The Presi- 
dent of the ABA has recently suggested that that organization 
develop or sponsor a model code of lawyer ~ivi1ity.l~~ Civility, 
however, is not the major problem a t  the lawmaking stage; per- 
sonal and professional interests are hard to subordinate. Indeed, 
139. See Burbank, supra note 12, at 1195 n.775. 
140. See Levin, supra note 132, at 899. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 121-27. 
142. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
143. N .  Lee Cooper, Courtesy Call, 83 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1997, at 8.  
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if the group I propose were to be established, a challenge for the 
appointing authorities would be precisely to find members who 
would have the respect and confidence of substantial segments 
of the practicing bar. 
These suggestions, however, are also premature, as I am 
reminded by the RAND Report that there is a metaprocedure for 
implementing procedural change. 
